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Ana Falcato 
Abstract: This essay situates J. M. Coetzee’s fiction within a recent philosophical attempt to reintroduce 
the poets into the philosophical republic. In particular, I develop an ethical reading of Coetzee’s 
novelistic project that is grounded in an understanding of the literary work as an event. The idea was 
first applied to Coetzee’s oeuvre by Derek Attridge and supports the singularity of the encounter with 
the literary piece as a transformative, self-questioning moment. I apply this model to a reading of Diary 
of a Bad Year, and, after addressing issues of conventional taxonomy proposed by philosophers, I give 
the final word to Coetzee himself qua commentator of his own work. Finally, I suggest that we view 
Coetzee’s use of irony as a vehicle for both convention disruption and ethical responsibility.  
 
The presentation scene itself we skip. It is not a good idea to interrupt the narrative 
too often, since storytelling works by lulling the reader or listener into a dreamlike 
state in which the time and space of the real world fade away, superseded by the time 
and space of the fiction. Breaking into the dream draws attention to the 
constructedness of the story, and plays havoc with the realist illusion. However, 
unless certain scenes are skipped over, we will be here all afternoon. The skips are 
not part of the text, they are part of the performance 
J. M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello 
 
Introduction 
Moral philosophers and philosophers of aesthetics have long relied on examples from literature. Indeed, 
an ongoing conversation between a cluster of contemporary philosophers and writers seems to indicate 
a modern lifting of the millennia-old ban, sanctioned by Plato, on the inclusion of literary writers in the 
philosophical republic. Relatively recent endeavors in philosophy and literature alike would seem to 
suggest that the two traditions have finally initiated a process of reconciliation. As philosophers, though, 
we call for further support for this claim, as well as further clarification on how this reconciliation might 
be achieved. Hence the importance of tracking the moves of a new gathering of writers and philosophers, 
who transition between the two strands of this dialogue—from philosophy to literature, and then back 
again. Work in both fields illustrates the point: Stephen Mulhall’s The Wounded Animal (2009) discusses 
both J. M. Coetzee’s and (the fictional) Elizabeth Costello’s projects, describing them as manifestations 
of long-standing modernistic reflection on the conditions of literary formal realism; Coetzee’s The 
Childhood of Jesus (2013) neatly returns to the ancient philosophical dispute over the existence of 
universals. The intrinsic value of the dialogical form itself—a formal device Plato seems less willing to 
2 
 
do without—has been further reassessed and rendered more nuanced in recent philosophical work that 
uses dialogue as a means of resuming the interrupted conversation. In his response to Coetzee’s lectures 
on The Lives of Animals, for example, Peter Singer produced a philosophical dialogue, held between a 
philosopher called Peter and his daughter Naomi (see Singer). More recently, Paola Cavalieri has also 
used dialogue to discuss animal rights and to refute a form of moral perfectionism according to which 
moral status depends on the extent to which a being possesses certain hierarchically ordered 
“perfections” (e.g. consciousness, rationality, conceptual-linguistic abilities). Cavalieri uses dialogue to 
both reveal and challenge the way in which nonhuman animals, supposedly lacking these relevant 
“perfections” and thus neither moral agents nor moral subjects, are excluded from the moral realm 
altogether (see Cavalieri).  
What, then, is fueling this conversation? This essay will try to answer this question by entering 
the dialogue, and it will do so on different fronts. I begin by tracing the main steps of an approach to 
reading Coetzee developed by Derek Attridge in J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading. As the title 
suggests, Attridge argues at length that there is a strong ethical core at the heart of the aesthetics of 
Coetzee’s novels. Following Attridge’s lead, and engaging heavily with Jonathan Lear’s essay on Diary 
of a Bad Year, I focus my analysis on the alleged ethical motives behind Coetzee’s experimental 
upending of canonical literary conventions in Diary. In particular, I explore the motives behind 
Coetzee’s departure from standard novelistic form in this text and his use of the split page. I then closely 
consider Mulhall’s main thesis on the ethical import of Coetzee’s work, which I compare with an 
alternative explanatory model developed by Terry Eagleton. A provisional last word is then handed to 
Coetzee himself.  
Entering the age-old conversation from multiple angles, I aim to consider the implications of 
this reassessment for the practice of philosophical writing more generally. In this way, the following 
does not merely identify significant points of intersection between philosophy and literature but also 
performs a transformative shift in self-understanding, made possible by the ethical motive that lies at 




Anticipating Dialectics without Closure 
Since the publication of Dusklands in 1974, J. M. Coetzee has made a virtue of ambiguity at the level 
of style and classification. Puzzles concerning the association of his work with canonical movements—
realism, modernism, postmodernism—can be found in critical discussions by literary scholars and 
philosophers, in Coetzee’s own essays and interviews, and in the metareflective texts of the persona 
Elizabeth Costello. Costello’s meditations on and engagement with the Western literary canon are 
prolific. Not only does she recreate the life of Molly Bloom in her book The House on Eccles Street, but 
her first lecture at Appleton College (under the title “Realism”) opens as follows:1  
There is first of all the problem of the opening, namely, how to get us from where we are, which 
is, as yet, nowhere, to the far bank. It is a simple bridging problem, a problem of knocking 
together a bridge. People solve such problems every day. They solve them, and having solved 
them push on. Let us assume that, however it may have been done, it is done. Let us take it that 
the bridge is built and crossed, that we can put it out of our mind. We left behind the territory in 
which we were. We are in the far territory, where we want to be. (Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello 1) 
The image of a bridge that seemingly precedes the crossing from the blank page to the beginning of the 
story by both writer and reader is already part and parcel of that story, making the very naturalness of 
realistic prose an issue that is addressed by its being pointed at. 
Derek Attridge and others have been keen to stress the high artistic costs that came with 
Coetzee’s departure from politically effective realistic conventions in the first phase of his career, during 
the apartheid years that roughly covered the period between the publication of Dusklands and Age of 
Iron (1990) (Attridge 1–2). In an extremely helpful essay from 2010, Peter McDonald reveals the 
equivocality of Coetzee’s “eminently readable” prose when compared, for instance, with the jigsaw 
fragmentariness that constitutes the opening lines of Beckett’s The Unnamable—Beckett himself being 
a key reference point for Coetzee, a debt he extensively acknowledges in Doubling the Point (See 
Doubling 25).  
The inner tension arising from Coetzee’s combination of apparently linear, realistic plot 
structures, on the one hand (“the principal difficulty,” McDonald notes, “often seems to lie in the 
apparent accessibility of his writing” (483)), and first-personal allusiveness, non-realist scenarios, and 
unreliable descriptions, on the other, undermines a reception of the text as essentially representational. 
Furthermore, this dialectical clash at the level of narrative structure has been interpreted as a device 
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charged with an ethical purpose. In J. M. Coetzee and The Ethics of Reading, Attridge, following 
Coetzee’s lead from the 1987 text “The Novel Today,”2 insists that even the ethical purpose of the 
stylistic oppositions and plot contradictions in Coetzee’s fictional prose is far from straightforward. As 
he writes, “ethics concerns persons and not texts”; consequently, this claim about the ethical significance 
of the rhetorical devices in question must be qualified.  
Attridge introduces an explanatory model to account for the “ethical dimension” of acts of 
literary meaning production that unsettle the reader, alienating her from the text and thus rendering the 
act of reading an exercise of mediated access to the claims of Otherness. He makes his case for this idea 
by linking the act of reading Coetzee’s novels to an experience of the literary piece as an “event.” If one 
abandons the rather commonplace notion of the literary work as a “finished block,” a self-contained 
cultural product ready for consumption, one can begin to see it as an unfinished recipient and conveyer 
(for both writer and reader) of an experience of meaning, the acceptance of which has transformative 
potential. And this disruptive power—with regard to both the reader’s settled views and prejudices and 
her stance toward the literary work as a finished cultural and historical product—is precisely what makes 
reading literature an ethical act. As Attridge puts it: 
[T]he singular inventiveness of the work is what constitutes its otherness—not as an absolute 
quality, but one that is meaningful only in relation to a given context; otherness is always 
otherness to a particular self or situation. In order to be readable at all, otherness must turn into 
sameness, and it is this experience of transformation (which is a transformation of the reader’s 
habits, expectations, ways of understanding the world) that constitutes the event of the literary 
work. (Attridge 11) 
Attridge wants to say that this is both the effect produced by Coetzee’s novels—at the level of the 
reader’s experience—and what Coetzee himself intends for them to achieve, especially through his 
insistence on constructing literary characters that are “figures of alterity” or that represent the voice and 
the demands of Otherness (examples of which include Magda’s servants in In the Heart of the Country; 
the barbarians (especially the barbarian girl) in Waiting for the Barbarians; Vercueil in Age of Iron; and 
Anya in Diary of a Bad Year). I would add that our encounters with these figures of alterity and the 
disruption of our expectations regarding plot linearity and linguistic immediacy (to which McDonald so 
forcefully alludes) work in parallel to disrupt and unsettle us in our experience of the work—an 
unsettling that is best achieved when these devices are combined with the similarly disruptive depiction 
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of scenes of physical and psychological violence. This intricate dialectic does not resolve itself in an 
artificial harmonization of stylistic tension or in the reconciliation of viewpoints; rather, it works to bring 
the reader to an autonomous response precisely via her immersion in the paradox.  
 
Diary of a Soul’s Journey 
Despite the vastness of the South African author’s corpus, I have chosen to focus on Diary of a Bad 
Year as a means of illustrating the significance of these stylistic tensions and clashes of viewpoint. 
Although it stands out for a number of reasons, Diary is especially distinctive to the degree that it works 
to destabilize conceptions of genre. Indeed, the appropriateness of classifying this text as a novel has 
come under severe pressure; McDonald and Hayes, for example, portray the book as a further instance 
of Coetzee’s Beckettian anti-novelistic project (McDonald 493; Hayes 2, 224).   
Novel or anti-novel, what Coetzee primarily deploys here is an unusual formal technique: each 
page is divided into two or three separate sections, each representing a different character’s 
perspective—a device that has an initially destabilizing effect on the reader. The top section of the page 
consists of a series of “opinion chronicles” (a collection originally entitled “Strong Opinions”) by an 
experienced South African author, JC. The middle layer of the page corresponds to JC’s private voice 
and offers raw accounts of his daily encounters with his Filipino typist, the young and beautiful Anya, 
who is assisting him in the composition of his collection (commissioned by a German publisher). The 
lower layer of the page corresponds to the private voices of both Anya and Alan (Anya’s misogynistic 
partner). In the two lower layers of the text, Coetzee reveals the extent to which JC is both haunted by 
his impending death and somehow comforted by daily contact with a beautiful woman. A first encounter 
with this text thus brings the reader into contact with three private narrative voices (corresponding to 
JC, Anya and Alan), along with what might initially seem to be a fourth, public, “quasi-technical” 
narrative voice, represented by JC’s political opinions. This multiple structure provides a modernistic 
framing for “Strong Opinions” (we shall return to this idea in what follows). 
Questions about the relationship between stylistic devices—such as the split page—and the 
ethical ideas conveyed by a given novel can, of course, be situated within more general philosophical 
accounts of the impact of literary style (how a given position is articulated) on the statements being 
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expressed. In this context, we encounter philosophers—many of whom mirror the history of tensions 
within their own discipline—who struggle theoretically with (what is apparently) the same issue. A 
classic example of philosophical reflection on the significance of the style-content dichotomy, both in 
literature and philosophy, is Martha Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge, the introduction to which contains 
the following:  
The “ancient quarrel between the Poets and the Philosophers”, as Plato’s Republic . . . calls it, 
could be called a quarrel only because it was about a single subject. The subject was human life 
and how to live it. And the quarrel was a quarrel about literary form, as well as about ethical 
content, about literary forms understood as committed to certain ethical priorities. . . . Forms of 
writing were not seen as vessels into which different contents could be indifferently poured; form 
was itself a statement, a content. (15) 
On deeper analysis, Nussbaum’s claim reveals itself to be twofold: both in the philosophical text or 
essay (where literary style, the way content is conveyed, is often sacrificed in favor of substantial 
theoretical claims) and in the literary piece (where concern with form can reach such heights that content 
becomes impenetrable—arguably more so when one turns to modernist projects), style is an “assertion 
of content” in itself. But, as we shall see below, Nussbaum is far from being alone in maintaining this 
position in the current philosophical landscape.  
Because I have chosen to begin with a literary text, I will first concentrate on the second part of 
the claim quoted above and say that Diary’s prose, and in particular its formal structure, is a remarkable 
example of how the successful expression of propositional content is genuinely inseparable from matters 
of form. Coetzee’s text reveals that “[literary] form is itself a statement, a content,” such that formal 
composition is really a means of asserting—of putting forward—propositional claims. But the content 
conveyed by the literary form of Diary isn’t merely “rightly-shaped matter,” a casually well-
accomplished combination of compositional technique and the thought expressed by that literary 
framing. Rather, I will claim, Coetzee manages to convey ethical thought by staging a direct simulation 
of ethical thought, precisely because this simulation is presented in a register very close to his own. The 
result of the simulation is a collection of opinions (JC’s “Strong Opinions”) that is aesthetically maimed, 
theoretically convincing, and completely sterile, from a practical point of view—notions that will be 
developed in what follows. 
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At this point, two questions present themselves as interrelated: (1) What does it mean to argue 
that the structure of Diary conveys ethical thought? (2) How does the novel do this without slipping into 
what I will refer to as “ersatz ethical thought,” precisely by staging a version of this kind of 
displacement?3  
Some philosophers (e.g. Jonathan Lear, “Ethical Thought”) have argued that it is easier for a 
well-trained novelist to notice and prevent the communication of ersatz ethical thought than for a 
philosopher to do so, practiced as the latter is both in compressing philosophical questions into abstract, 
deductive systems of reasoning and in crafting the ordered, linear texts characteristic of the discipline. 
For the sake of better understanding the notion of ersatz ethical thought, then, consider the following 
thought experiment, centered on the figure of a philosopher who is trying to put forth an ethical claim. 
(In light of what has already been said, you might further conceive of JC as just such a philosopher.) 
Imagine that our philosopher wishes to communicate a certain idea: namely, that the most 
important truths about human psychology cannot be communicated or grasped by intellectual activity 
alone, since powerful emotions play an irreducible cognitive role in self-understanding. If he states this 
view in a written form that expresses only intellectual activity and addresses itself only to the reader’s 
intellect—as is usually the case in philosophical essays, and is surely the case in “Strong Opinions”—
we face the following questions: Does the author really believe what his words seem to state? How can 
he avoid the charge of inconsistency? The philosopher may believe that the psychological thesis itself 
is not among the truths that must be grasped through emotional activity. Or he may believe that the 
thesis is among those truths but remain indifferent as to whether or not the reader grasps it. Whatever 
the case, our example demonstrates how easily and intuitively the paradox arises. By contrast, a writer 
aiming to convey the same idea can avoid the charge of inconsistency to the degree that he expresses its 
(merely) propositional content through the text’s formal features, such that the relevant claim about self-
knowledge is revealed to the reader precisely via formal devices that allow for emotional engagement 
(which is certainly not the case with regard to JC’s work). Such a writer can even directly display this 
conflict to the reader by incorporating philosophical discussion of the relevant idea into a broader literary 
work that ultimately illuminates the inconsistencies associated with its purely intellectual expression 
taken in isolation. We shall see that Coetzee (unlike JC) performs both moves in Diary. 
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Modern literary works like Coetzee’s Diary seem to make this complicated unfolding possible: 
in allowing for the combination of emotive and reflective material, they reveal the truth of claims such 
as the one outlined above, where an appeal to intellect alone is clearly insufficient. Crucially, they are 
able to reveal the inconsistency of claims like this by incorporating their philosophical formulation. 
Thus attention to the specific kind of storytelling at work in a text like Diary both helps us to overcome 
the difficulties affecting these sorts of claims and reveals a strategy for answering questions (1) and (2). 
If conveying ethical thought via writing involves providing some kind of practical guidance as to how 
one should live, as well as guidance on how to read the text in question and appreciate its message, then 
we can say that Diary does both by incorporating a vision of how one can fail in both regards, i.e. by 
calling the reader’s attention to how the expression of genuine ethical thought in such a text can slip 
easily into the communication of ersatz ethical thought, and by isolating and thus revealing a layer of 
interpretation (a way of reading the text) that is both tempting and inadequate. Ersatz ethical thought is 
the mere simulation of ethical thought: a substitute for genuine ethical thought which, although 
intellectually graspable, does not actually make a practical difference in terms of how we shape the 
world and behave. As Coetzee seems to imply, this is the form of thought expressed in “Strong 
Opinions” and in JC’s stance towards his book and its readership. 
With this brief sketch of the problem in hand, we can now begin to turn to another question 
raised by Coetzee’s method in Diary: How can a text convey genuine ethical thought as opposed to mere 
ersatz ethical thought? Is this at all possible? We shall see more clearly how, in Diary of a Bad Year, 
Coetzee’s answer to this question hinges on the triadic structure of the page and our confrontation with 
the book within the book, i.e. “Strong Opinions,” situated as it is within Diary. 
 
 
The writer’s writer and substitute ethical thought 
It may be tempting to identify the author of “Strong Opinions” with the author of Diary of a Bad Year. 
The ostensibly straightforward identification of JC with John Coetzee is only partially accurate, 
however, and more must be said on this point. In truth, the connection between JC and John Coetzee 
has highly elusive (and not merely stylistic) implications; it is no mere curiosity, reducible to self-
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indulgent vanity on Coetzee’s part. Indeed, the temptation to merge their identities is a result of our 
having succumbed, in part, to ersatz ethical thought. 
JC is an elderly South African writer who has recently relocated to Australia. When asked by a 
German publisher, he agrees to record his opinions on some of the most pressing issues of global society 
(terrorism, ethnic conflicts, global warming, animal rights, genetic experiments) in a collection of 
essays. As JC confesses, the prospect is a welcome one: “An opportunity to grumble in public, an 
opportunity to take magic revenge on the world for declining to conform to my fantasies: how could I 
refuse?” (33). As tempting as it may be for readers to conflate JC and John Coetzee, however, there is 
something that sets the two apart unmistakably. JC is willing to publish his strong opinions on 
contemporary social issues precisely as they stand: parched theoretical fruits from a stage of life of 
decreasing vitality. John Coetzee is not willing to do so. The latter published a set of strong opinions 
alongside “soft opinions”: a “Second Diary” of intimate notes on the everyday life of a man sinking 
steadily toward decrepitude—some erotic, but most representing an almost always dull routine involving 
a series of nuisances. This second diary is the text that occupies the lower layers of Diary’s pages. John 
Coetzee tells us about JC, and it is only in doing so that he gives us access to his opinion essays. The 
formal technique employed by Coetzee in Diary of a Bad Year can be interpreted as a rhetorical 
maneuver that confronts the reader with a challenge (a difficulty, one might say) and thereby manages 
to convey disparate contents, graspable only by “different parts of the soul” (Lear, “Ethical Thought” 
70). The book “Strong Opinions” is embedded in Diary of a Bad Year; were it published in isolation, it 
would require a different kind of focus from that which the reader brings to the latter. 
The disparity between the type of content articulated at the top of the page in “Strong Opinions,” 
on the one hand, and JC’s, Anya’s and Alan’s notes on daily life, on the other, is sufficiently striking to 
induce a conflict for the reader, particularly when it comes to how she ought to assimilate what she 
reads. The following passages, for instance, reveal how and to what extent this is so: 
[“Strong Opinions”] One would like to retain some respect for any person who chooses death 
over dishonor, but in the case of Islamist suicide bombers respect does not come easily when 
one sees how many of them there are, and therefore (by a logical step that may be badly flawed, 
that may simply express the old Western prejudice against the mass mentality of the Other) how 
cheaply they must value life. In such a quandary, it may help to think of suicide bombings as a 
response, of a somehow despairing nature, against American (and Israeli) achievements in 
guiding technology far beyond the capacities of their opponents.  
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[Private dialogue between Anya and JC] Nothing like the feel of words coming into the world, 
he says, it is enough to make you shiver. I draw myself up, make a prune mouth. You shouldn’t 
say things like that to a nice girl, Señor, I say. And I turn my back and off I go with a waggle of 
the bum, his eyes avid upon me. I picked it up from the ducks, I think: a shake of the tail so quick 
it is almost a shiver. Quick-quack. (39–40) 
Were we to read JC’s “Strong Opinions” on its own, approaching the broader work in which it is situated 
only horizontally, as it were, we would encounter a space of argumentation. JC’s book, which John 
Coetzee refuses to present to us separately, addresses the rational part of the soul almost exclusively. 
This approach relies on the affinity between sender and receiver, insofar as the rational part of JC’s soul 
addresses the rational part of the reader’s soul. (Obviously, this is an oversimplification; it is useful, 
however, when it comes to the issue of methodology in interpreting Diary and Coetzee’s therapeutic 
role as writer and creator of JC.) 
If we instead adopt a vertical reading of the pages of Diary of a Bad Year, we come across what 
Jonathan Lear calls “a spectacle of embedding” (“Ethical Thought” 70). Relying on the plasticity of this 
expression, Lear describes the heart of the connection between the book’s page structure and Coetzee’s 
handling of the stories of his main characters. If we read the book vertically, we see how the compilation 
of JC’s strong opinions is embedded in the presentation of the fantasies and daily lives of the three main 
characters. As we read down the page, we also move further into the lower part of the soul (and even to 
the presentation of lower parts of the body: Anya’s body, JC’s body and Alan’s body). This “inferior” 
display of aspects of daily life is the separable (because useless) part of a book of strong opinions on 
contemporary social and political issues from an ethical perspective. With this said, however, this lower 
part is undoubtedly pivotal to (and inseparable from) the book’s capacity to prompt the complicated 
dialectic of reading that Diary demands of us. “Strong Opinions” is thus a realistic (pseudo) book written 
in the form and under the influence of argument, but this form is only one aspect of the organic unity of 
form and matter embodied by JC’s collection, embedded as it is in the episodes that make up his daily 
life. JC’s authority as a character influences the fundamental structure of Diary; Coetzee has us actually 
read “Strong Opinions” and does not merely tell us about the process of its composition (which would 
detract considerably from the novel’s effectiveness). 
We must examine things in more detail and finally move beyond the more or less 
methodological and associative elements discussed until now if we want to make clear how embedding 
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JC’s strong moral opinions in descriptions of private daily life prevents the communication of substitute 
ethical thought and instead promotes authentic ethical thought through the text’s destabilizing form. To 
do so, I will proceed as follows: (a) I will examine how the compositional form of Diary of a Bad Year 
precludes what I have been calling ersatz ethical thought by incorporating a simulation of the latter; and 
(b) I will analyze one of the opinions in “Strong Opinions,” as a case study of sorts, in order to obtain 
confirmation of (a). 
 
The Substitution of Ersatz Ethical Thought 
Let us look more closely at the notion of “ersatz ethical thought.” Once again, the underlying idea can 
most easily be expressed via consideration of a thought experiment. Let us imagine that a respectable 
academic—a professor of ethics at Yale, for instance—spends one semester at Yale and another 
semester each year at a foreign university. Let us also imagine that our distinguished academic has a 
teaching commitment that makes it necessary for him to commute between Europe and the United States. 
This distinguished figure dedicates his professional life to writing technical articles, opinion columns 
and conference presentations on “contemporary ethical issues” (we can easily imagine that one of these 
articles bears the title “The Ethics of Reading J. M. Coetzee”). University professors are usually well 
paid, both in Europe and in America, and our notable academic is no exception. Committed to writing 
specialized articles, opinion columns and encyclopedia entries on subjects such as global warming, 
animal rights, gender-based violence, the Middle East, pedophilia, the sale of nuclear weapons to Iran, 
and ersatz ethical thought, our distinguished academic has grown accustomed to accepting things as they 
stand in a globalized world and in the social contexts in which he engages, whilst also taking advantage 
of his prestige and intellectual influence. The sort of work carried out by our notable academic—who is 
surely too realistic to have been made up—could be considered one instance of ersatz ethical thought, 
especially insofar as its (alleged) ethical content is conveyed as mere information (just like “Strong 
Opinions” and, possibly, this essay) without any need for emotional involvement.  
With this example at hand, let us return to Diary. When narrating first-hand experiences of 
barbaric situations, the tone displayed by Coetzee’s narrators tends to be unsettlingly apathetic (this 
apathy is often both sharpened and problematized by the intrusion of an ironic overtone).4 Here, of 
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course, the existence of a uniform “narrative tone” is undermined at the outset by the layering of different 
characters’ voices. It is not only that each character displays different, more or less identifiable tonalities 
or moods; with the exception of Alan, these tones tend to evolve with the unfolding of the plot(s). 
Whereas the “mood” detectable in JC’s first round of essays is dry and dispassionate, these features 
progressively vanish in the second diary. This is acknowledged by JC himself, who attributes the change 
to his daily conversations with Anya. Toward the end of “Strong Opinions,” JC explicitly acknowledges 
this debt: “What has begun to change since I moved into the orbit of Anya is not my opinions themselves 
so much as my opinion of my opinions” (136). Anya also becomes more compassionate, and her tone 
of voice softens by the end of the novel. 
As we shall see, however, it is precisely Coetzee’s unwillingness to settle on a single, 
authoritative, positional narrative voice that provides an antidote to any conceivable form of substitute 
ethical thought. Diary portrays something that is itself an ethical issue: the intrusion of forms of ersatz 
ethical thought into a literary work that aims to convey ethical content. Mostly by way of the inclusion 
of “Strong Opinions,” Coetzee’s technique allows him to show how difficult it is for a literary text—
one meant to convey ethical thought—to avoid becoming a vehicle for ersatz ethical thought (such as 
an opinion chronicle, for instance). JC falls into this very trap, and he is “a prestigious South African 
writer.” What guarantee do we have that John Coetzee will not do the same?  
Coetzee’s work has always incorporated a heavily self-referential component. In Dusklands, 
Coetzee presents us with two novellas: “The Vietnam Project” and “The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee.” 
The second deals with the adventures of a Dutch frontier dweller in eighteenth-century South Africa—
a racist explorer, who treats the native inhabitants of the country as totally subordinate to the white 
conqueror, often punishing them physically. Jacobus Coetzee’s manuscript is allegedly discovered and 
translated from Dutch and Afrikaans by one J. M. Coetzee. 
In more recent books, and in addition to Diary, we again encounter remarkable self-referential 
strategies. Whereas the technique for preventing ersatz ethical thought in Diary is mostly based on the 
triadic narrative voice—with the nuances and degrees of formality I have analyzed thus far—the relevant 
technique in Summertime (2009), for example, is its post-mortem structure. The writer John Coetzee has 
recently passed away, and the whole book, whose starting point is this very fact, is a collection of 
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personal accounts of his life, as related by different narrators (including a former lover, a neighbor, and 
the mother of a former student in Cape Town).  
Insofar as the (potentially dangerous) self-referential literary techniques vastly and variously 
employed in his books are one of Coetzee’s assets in defeating ersatz ethical thought, and insofar as 
defeating it matters at least as much to us as finding out how such a defeat might be accomplished in 
both literature and philosophy, I shall concentrate on the details of these techniques in Coetzee’s novels, 
later applying the results to my own philosophical inquiries. Having already explored one such 
maneuver—the complex overlapping of the personal identities of Coetzee and JC—we shall now turn 
to another: JC’s commitment to specific political views that are easily attributable to John Coetzee.  
 
The Dialectic of Responsibility  
In the “spectacle of embedding” that is Diary of a Bad Year, a reflection entitled “On National Shame” 
is included as a section of JC’s “Strong Opinions.” In this section, JC is credited with having written the 
following: 
An article in a recent New Yorker makes it plain as day that the US administration, with the lead 
taken by Richard Cheney, not only sanctions the torture of prisoners taken in the so-called war 
on terror but is active in every way to subvert laws and conventions proscribing torture. . . .Their 
shamelessness is quite extraordinary. Their denials are less than half-hearted. The distinction 
their hired lawyers draw between torture and coercion is patently insincere, pro forma. In the 
new dispensation we have created, they implicitly say, the old powers of shame have been 
abolished. Whatever abhorrence you may feel counts for nothing. You cannot touch us, we are 
too powerful. 
Demosthenes: Whereas the slave fears only pain, what the free man fears most is shame. If we 
grant the truth of what the New Yorker claims, then the issue for individual Americans becomes 
a moral one: how, in the face of this shame to which I am subjected, do I behave? How do I save 
my honour? . . . Dishonour is no respecter of fine distinctions. Dishonour descends upon one’s 
shoulders, and once it has descended no amount of clever pleading will dispel it. (48–59) 
The aim of this reflection (both JC’s and my own in this paper) is to inquire into how the relevant “moral 
issue” can be articulated by means of what I, following Jonathan Lear, have called the “dialectic of 
responsibility.” Within JC’s Strong Opinions itself, there is a sort of “division of explanatory labor” at 
work between a broader theoretical position (a view on national shame) and the illustration of that 
position (examples of torture) in “On National Shame.” Furthermore, to the extent that we are familiar 
with Coetzee’s work (his fiction and his essays) and are thus acquainted with some of his own public 
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views on international politics, we could easily ascribe this stance on American governmental decrees 
related to the so-called post-9/11 “war on terror,” here apparently held by JC, to Coetzee himself. 
In the preceding section of “Strong Opinions,” JC analyses a moral-political position held by 
Machiavelli in The Prince: the Necessità. 
Necessity, Necessità, is Machiavelli’s guiding principle. The old, pre-Machiavellian position 
was that the moral law was supreme. If it so happened that the moral law was sometimes broken, 
that was unfortunate, but rulers were merely human, after all. The new, Machiavellian position 
is that infringing the moral law is justified when it is necessary. Thus is inaugurated the dualism 
of modern political culture, which simultaneously upholds absolute and relative standards of 
value. The modern state appeals to morality, to religion, and to natural law as the ideological 
foundation of its existence. At the same time it is prepared to infringe any or all of these in the 
interest of self-preservation.  
Machiavelli does not deny that the claims morality makes on us are absolute. At the same time 
he asserts that in the interest of the state the ruler “is often obliged [necessitato] to act without 
loyalty, without mercy, without humanity, and without religion.”5 (26)  
A suitable adaptation of Machiavelli’s idea, here, is the notion that there is no such thing as 
national shame, let alone “shame assimilated by mere citizenship,” because one must do whatever one 
must in order to protect and preserve the state (this is contrary to what JC contends, even though Coetzee 
portrays JC as including a quotation from The Prince in “Strong Opinions”). Yet an important social 
group, which JC calls “liberal intellectuals,” rejects both Machiavelli’s Necessità and the “assimilation 
of shame by citizenship” argued for by JC. Here, JC refers specifically to the Bush administration and 
to the behavior and political views held by liberal intellectuals in post-9/11 American society, where 
these intellectuals aimed to distance themselves from both positions by means of rational self-
justification. This specific example represents a more generalizable ethical posture, however, in which 
personal responsibility is denied and blame shifted to another. The dialectic of responsibility, aimed at 
deconstructing this posture for the reader of both the book and the pseudo-book (Diary and “Strong 
Opinions”), will operate through my own interpretation of JC’s argument for national shame in this 
section of “Strong Opinions,” to which we now turn. This stance is easily attributable to Coetzee himself, 
and the following analysis aims in part to reveal the role that JC—himself a fictional creation—plays 
with regard to the author of Diary.  
JC describes the mechanism of a self-justifying denial of national shame as involving three 
steps: (1) the ascription of shameful guilt to the political leaders of the relevant country—i.e. US post-
9/11 political leaders; (2) a massive distancing from the positions adopted and the actions carried out by 
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these leaders; and (3) a rejection of both moral dualism and the divide between theory and practice 
inherent in Machiavelli’s Necessità. Liberal intellectuals actively want to distance themselves from both 
the central idea of Necessità and the attribution of national shame, precisely because such positions 
implicate them. However, there is something the liberal intellectual doesn’t see—mostly because he 
cannot see it—and this is the fact that shameful guilt descends like a curse and cannot be removed by 
argument. Liberal intellectuals cannot recognize this phenomenon because they want to deny their 
involvement in national shame by way of logical justification. At this point in JC’s strong opinion on 
national shame, the astute reader of Diary gradually realizes that JC is talking about and to the reader 
herself whenever he writes about “liberal intellectuals,” describing their behavior and the structure of 
their stance in view of this specific moral and political issue. And, at the same time that this maneuver 
is acknowledged, the reader is further reminded that JC is no more than a product of Coetzee’s literary 
imagination. Although Coetzee gives us more than “Strong Opinions,” he nonetheless offers it to us, 
and so must be held accountable for whatever positions are defended therein,6 even if he sometimes 
feels tempted to decry JC’s decrepitude and misogyny and never completely identifies himself with his 
character-writer (thus making things easier for him and harder for us). In spite of the likely frustration 
caused by this device, the dialectic of responsibility extends to the reader herself, who, after all, chose 
to take up the novel in the first place. 
The dialectic of responsibility can therefore be said to act upon the reader of Diary of a Bad 
Year via a mechanism of identification. At the moment in Diary where the above quotation occurs, it is 
most likely Coetzee who wants to make us understand that there is something extremely inconsistent 
about the stance of these “liberal intellectuals.” More specifically: how can “they” be opposed to both 
Machiavelli’s Necessità, as a positive stance, and the assimilation of shame by citizenship, when both 
positions represent contradictory yet complementary ideas that “exhaustively cover a domain of 
intelligible positions”? The problem arises precisely because one must choose between the following 
options: (a) either there is no such thing as national shame, because one must do whatever is needed to 
protect the interests of the state (Necessità); or (b) national shame exists and does not pertain exclusively 
to political leaders; insofar as it spreads via non-rational mechanisms, its removal cannot be effected by 
rational justification, and these leaders were elected by the public. To accuse political leaders of 
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“shameful behavior” is already to experience the curse of this shame. This inconsistency, however, 
belongs also to me: an astute, well-informed reader of Diary of a Bad Year. I am perfectly capable of 
understanding the structural paths of this inconsistency, and I can even detect the responsibility-
divesting cynicism inherent in it, so long as I am able to rely on the scapegoat of the third person. It is 
“them” of which we speak, the so-called “liberal intellectuals.” Only by means of the formal use of the 
third person to refer to this social group does Coetzee manage to convey his intended content in an 
effective way, removing the veil of blindness that risks shielding the eyes of the liberal intellectual 
reader. The dialectic of responsibility is the reading process by which we achieve the lifting of this veil. 
It is more than plausible to suppose that, upon finishing Diary, one might come to view this 
formal strategy as a “formal subterfuge” and thus be left feeling naked and doubly deceived—for we do 
not like the position held by the liberal intellectuals, which isn’t actually “their” position, but rather ours, 
and we do not like the way Coetzee’s text pretends to tell us about an abstract group of people who can 
only stand for strong positions by being blind to their own point of view, when actually it describes us. 
The dialectic of responsibility—this whole process—functions as a bridge between the formal method 
of writing and the act of conveying ethical content (both as a “material” posture towards human action 
and as a strategy for reading the book). It is by means of this dialectic that the reader manages not only 
to understand her place on the plane of reasons embodied by Diary of a Bad Year—becoming aware 
that she is an integral part of this space and not a mere spectator—but also to replace substitute ethical 
thought (the only kind available to any reader who merely occupies the position of spectator) with a 
straightforward but difficult ethical attitude: a commitment to decide how she should live and behave, 
given the shame that is hers ab initio—maybe because she is American, most likely because she is 
human. But why did Coetzee feel compelled to use JC to morally educate his readers while refusing to 
reveal his precise relation to this character and to his views? Isn’t this, after all, sheer abuse of well-
known rhetorical devices? In other words, isn’t he as shameless as any liberal intellectual? 
 
Partially Unveiled Methodology   
Admittedly, we may not settle on the interpretation of Diary I have been offering here; it is, after all, 
just one of many possible approaches to Coetzee’s work, with its own potential shortcomings (for which 
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I alone am responsible). With this said, however, two points in particular have thus far become apparent. 
Both in the sections Coetzee wants to attribute to JC and in the lower sections of the page that we readers 
are at least allowed to suppose are Coetzee’s, the writing style is extremely clear, descriptive and neat. 
Indeed, in a text with a graphic structure as reader-unfriendly as Diary’s, Coetzee must avoid obscurity 
and linguistic excess if he wants the narrative to progress through the different sections of the book’s 
pages, to preserve the important connections between them, and still to hold the reader’s attention. On 
the other hand, the narrative device of a split in different characters’ voices instantiates a gap with regard 
to the identity of the novel’s author at the very outset. The structure of the book’s page is of course 
highly unconventional, and both it and the related identity split between JC and John Coetzee are 
features that the reader confronts from the moment she takes up the novel. Philosophers are drawn to 
Coetzee’s texts in part because of their complexity and the hard stylistic puzzles they contain. My 
reading of Diary, whether or not it is ultimately helpful, can also be viewed as a response to its ostensibly 
puzzling rhetorical features. The complexity of this interpretation directly reflects the complexity of the 
book’s structure—an enticement with which Coetzee subtly provokes philosophical engagement.  
Stephen Mulhall has also commented extensively on key features of Coetzee’s “dialectical” 
prose in terms of period aesthetics. On Mulhall’s view, Coetzee’s work is best described as “realist 
modernist” (Wounded 162), both because of its systematic formal features and because so much of his 
fictional writing contains careful metareflection on the historical evolution of literary realism and 
modernism. There is much that is right about this description. In truth, however, even the realistic effects 
in Coetzean prose are both framed by distinct mechanisms of self-awareness and accompanied by 
Coetzee’s intentional interference with the transparency of discourse. Still, Mulhall’s argument is highly 
relevant to my reflections here, particularly to the extent that he argues that a parallel struggle between 
realism and modernism, in terms of both technique and the corresponding impact on thematic issues, is 
intrinsic both to the imaginatively mimetic design of the modern novel since its inception (be it the 
nostalgic parable of Don Quixote or the pioneering realistic reportage of Daniel Defoe) and to the 
realistic efforts of modern philosophical projects that historically coincide with the emergence of the 
new literary genre. Here, Mulhall refers specifically to the anti-authoritarian arguments of modern 
philosophers and scientists such as Bacon, Descartes, Locke and Hume, who systematically rebelled 
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against Aristotelianism and religious restrictions on the announcement of scientific breakthroughs. In 
The Wounded Animal, we find the following comments on both traditions: 
The history of the novel since Defoe, Richardson and Sterne might therefore be written entirely 
in terms of the ways in which novelists repeatedly subject their inheritance of realistic 
conventions to critical questioning in order to recreate the impression of reality in their readers 
(in large part by encouraging those readers to see prior uses of convention to represent the real 
as merely conventional in contrast with their own, far more convincing ones). . . . [I]t is not 
simply that the novel has a cannibalistic relation to other literary genres; from the outset, its 
practitioners had a similarly Oedipal relation to prior examples within the genre of the novel, 
and so to the prior conventions within which they necessarily operated. (145)   
The cannibalistic threat to former projects of both traditions extends itself further as the fundamental 
hermeneutic principle of the dialectical reading I will be developing here—a reading which, as we shall 
see, also incorporates an element of self-overcoming regarding its own methodological inheritance.  
The crucial issue at this point may be put as follows: recent philosophical projects—such as 
Mulhall’s reading of Elizabeth Costello or Lear’s reading of Diary of a Bad Year—have turned to the 
work of a great contemporary novelist and found that they have such-and-such to say about it, showing 
an openness to literature and literary criticism that surpasses the Socratic prejudices against artists and 
thus allows for the reintegration of writers into the philosophical citadel. But who in turn examines these 
philosophical commentaries? Coetzee himself tends to be extremely critical when engaging in reflection 
of this sort—as occurs, for instance, in his dismissal of the single-minded philosophical voice of JC 
within the overall framework of Diary, which leads him to write a book that is utterly different from 
JC’s realistic set of chronicles on contemporary ethical and political issues. And JC’s ultimately single-
minded voice is in very good company within Coetzee’s work as a whole. Other examples of staged 
dialogues with philosophers that don’t favor the latter include Elizabeth Costello’s acrid reactions to 
both her professional (and unemployed) philosopher daughter-in-law, Norma Bernard, and the 
philosophical community at Appleton College; her alternative accounts of animal ethics; and the strong 
opposition faced by David, the main character in The Childhood of Jesus, when he attempts to “play 
Socrates” and lead abstract discussions on virtues and vices with his co-workers at the grain warehouse. 
Is there perhaps a more genial approach to philosophy available to us? 
 
A Further Contributor  
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I began by considering Attridge’s and McDonald’s direct arguments for explaining the inner tensions 
found in Coetzee’s fiction, thereby introducing a further voice in this complex dialogue between 
(contemporary) literature and (contemporary) philosophy: the voice of the literary critic. I now wish to 
return to this contribution in a way that allows me to show a) that the realism-modernism dialectic that 
Mulhall detects in Coetzee’s work is not resolved in a clear-cut synthesis, and b) that for Coetzee, irony 
plays a crucial role in undermining all neat distinctions.  
Alongside Mulhall’s attempt to explain the realist-modernist dynamic, which looks specifically 
at Coetzee’s novels (even more specifically, at Elizabeth Costello), Terry Eagleton offers his own 
(recognizably Marxist) explanatory model in the 2005 monograph The English Novel: An Introduction.7 
Without discussing Coetzee, Eagleton insists that it was the distinctive rise of the middle class 
throughout eighteenth-century Europe that, via a narrative mirroring of its social structures and 
aspirations, paved the way for the realist novel. He grounds his critical reading of canonical English-
language novels, reaching from the work of Daniel Defoe to that of Virginia Woolf (the book not only 
develops a historical model for interpreting the evolution of the genre but also follows the historical 
evolution of the canon), on an essentially sociological model, arguing that the ascending middle class 
can be characterized as the great protagonist of the liberal values of individual self-determination and 
prosperity, unwilling to stand for romantic myths and general abstractions, and that its most 
representative writers projected the main values defended by the class to which they belong. For 
Eagleton, then, the realistic prose of most eighteenth-century literature both mirrors and embodies the 
pragmatic values of a new social order. If we accept that the purpose of the realistic novel is to do justice 
to the facts, to life as it stands in this new social configuration, we must also assume that this social 
mirroring, arguably accomplished through an inevitably conventional medium—a natural language—is 
the true purpose of realistic prose. The linguistic convention that makes narrative possible is thus an 
essentially phenomenal device, in the sense that it allows for the linguistic manifestation of the (socially 
relevant) facts as they stand. Both in the introduction to his study, “What is a Novel,” and in his critical 
discussion of the canon, Eagleton relies on a socio-dialectical model to explain literary formal realism. 
According to this stance, the realistic, self-effacing style of the eighteenth-century English novel was as 
much a product of the contemporary liberal social order as the modernistic turn of the early twentieth 
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century was a product of the social and political disasters that resulted in the Holocaust. To Eagleton, if 
the novel does indeed have representative potential, so does the social order whose essentially 
evolutionary dialectic can also be depicted by conventional linguistic means.  
By contrast, Stephen Mulhall (in two chapters in The Wounded Animal and two essays in The 
Self and Its Shadows)8 considers the tension between realism and modernism in Coetzee’s work, 
detecting in the latter’s working out of the realist-modernist tension we’ve analyzed above what I will 
term a “conventionalist” pattern of self-overcoming with regard to inherited literary styles. At the risk 
of oversimplifying Mulhall’s dense account of realist modernism in the contemporary novel, I want to 
present his proposal as follows. He insists on the presence of an inner and inevitably doomed struggle 
within novelistic literary prose itself, in place since the very inception of the genre, and argues that the 
novel has been dialectically fighting its own conventional status as an artistic genre in the name of 
fidelity to the facts. However, since these supposed facts are themselves a product of the literary 
imagination (and since, as linguistic creations, they are particularly “conventional”), the realistic novel 
is logically doomed to inflict on its descendants the same Oedipal tension it inherited from its ancestors 
(this is the material point of his quotation above). This dialectic of self-overcoming is made all the more 
acute by a progressive awareness within the modernist tradition of the fact that the methodological 
design of formal realism can only be accomplished through a means of expression that is highly 
conventional or non-natural—a means that must be acknowledged as such. (According to this proposal, 
Coetzee’s literary project, not least because he is also an outstanding critic, inherits this self-conscious 
historical design.)  
The potential for reflection afforded by the insurmountable barrier separating the realistic writer 
from the factual world that his prose intends to represent provides a path for awareness of the facticity 
of the prose itself and for reflection, through that very prose, on both its representative potential and its 
representative limits. This in turn calls for a reflective fold within the prose itself in what concerns the 
conditions of its own possibility as a (conventional) representative device—something we’ve seen 
exemplified in Coetzee’s modernistic approach to his own literary project, e.g. by reflecting on the 
conditions of the composition of “Strong Opinions” as an element within Diary. (The quotation in the 
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epigraph to this paper is an even more explicit example of the metareflection on the conventions of the 
genre that is so often performed in Coetzee’s novels.)  
Having contrasted Eagleton’s materialistic account of the historical birth of modernist literature 
with Mulhall’s conventionalist model, we should perhaps be satisfied with the explanatory clarity with 
which both critically resume the conversation that Plato had so forcefully discouraged. But can we really 
settle the matter with philosophy? Is this not, perhaps, a modern echo of the Republic?  
 
Breaking the Spell of Reality, Ironically 
What have we accomplished thus far? I began by mentioning an ongoing conversation between 
philosophers and writers (especially novelists) that seems to rescue the latter from Plato’s exile. (It is 
also important to stress here that this is mainly a worry for philosophy, since the poets were never greatly 
concerned about their ostracism from philosophy.) As it happens, John Coetzee (in Diary of a Bad Year 
and elsewhere) seems to turn Plato’s worries upside down. Plato complained that poetry, due to its 
idolatrous character, leads us away from virtue, and that an excessive focus on images addresses only 
the appetitive part of the soul, leaving our rational faculty hungry for argument. In a subversive move, 
Coetzee directs these charges to the philosopher him- or herself. What is more, he carefully avoids 
falling prey to the pitfalls (outlined above) associated with presenting ethical views via mere argument 
by paying close attention to form. Indeed, the presentation of JC’s arguments and the performance of 
their ultimate inadequacy serve to free Coetzee, JC, and the reader from the bonds of mere argument.   
In the preceding section, I presented a two-pronged (philosophical) reading of the evolution of 
realism and modernism in the history of the novel, thereby generating a fiction of my own about the sort 
of literary prose that aims to represent invented stories about made up characters whilst doing justice to 
social and psychological reality. I gave names to the two explanatory models that account for the 
realism-modernism dialectic in the history of the novel, arguing that, whereas Eagleton’s model is 
essentially socio-dialectical, Mulhall’s account emphasizes a conscious self-overcoming of the 
constraints provided by literary conventions. I now want to say that, in truth, neither of the two models 
succeeds in satisfactorily accommodating another significant feature of Coetzee’s prose, which upends 
the neatly polarized tensions I’ve been discussing. Put broadly, this noteworthy feature is irony (we’ll 
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come to examples in a moment). But to start seeing why neither of the two models accommodates the 
irony that so characterizes Coetzean prose, we must add to my own analysis of the split page a 
consideration of the remarkable methodological differences between the voices of JC and (presumably) 
John Coetzee in Diary of a Bad Year—a device by which the reader, for whom engagement with the 
text has ethical-therapeutic consequences, is brought face to face both with the instability of authorial 
identity and with the inadequacy of uncritically assimilating the two voices. The passages in both 
“Strong Opinions” and the lower sections that Anya encourages JC to call “soft opinions” cited above 
attest to a genuine difference at the level of tone. Moreover, we’ve seen that there are no enduring, fixed 
tones ascribable to Coetzee’s characters: they evolve throughout the story. Still, there is no denying that 
JC’s writing is as informative and opinionated as a thematic essay can be, and he never allows his 
reasoning to deviate from a clear argumentative pattern. “Strong Opinions” is rightly described as a 
realistic report on contemporary ethical and political issues. In the lower sections of the page—where 
we are also told about how the upper sections were produced—Coetzee departs from straightforward 
reasoning, allowing for suspensions, onomatopoeia and markedly emotive language. It seems likely that 
Coetzee wants his readers to realize that and how a maximally comprehensive literary achievement 
cannot rely merely on the politically realistic prose characteristic of JC’s voice. Coetzee shows us this, 
as we’ve seen, via his modernistic locating of “Strong Opinions” literally at the top of the larger book. 
If this embedding is one of the key features of Coetzee’s literary project at this stage of its 
evolution (a project that we know has evolved further in the meantime), and if one of the practical—
ethical, in the sense developed by Attridge—outcomes of this maneuver is the dialectic of responsibility, 
how can an explanatory essay on Diary of a Bad Year and its modernistic refinement possibly escape 
the fate of ersatz ethical thought? What I want to say is: how can a plausible theory of ersatz ethical 
thought avoid collapsing into mere ersatz thought itself, where such failure is attributable in part to its 
very plausibility and persuasiveness? After all, the discovery of a good explanatory model usually 
provides us with a grounded excuse to stop thinking about the topic it explains. We assume that we 
know, and we proceed from there. As we’ve seen, by Coetzee’s lights, both the theory and our 
acceptance of it are forms of substitution ethical thought. Thus we might suspect that this paper, to the 
degree that its aim is to prevent ersatz ethical thought, should itself have been written in three layers. 
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But then, what would have been the point of writing it, other than to rephrase Diary of a Bad Year, 
recomposing it in other words and perhaps doing harm to the original’s reputation?  
Is there anything left for us to do when the target of our inquiry, with which we are directly 
confronted, throws itself back upon us? Might Coetzee himself give us something of a clue about how 
to address this worry? What I want to suggest, in fact, is that this essay opened with precisely such a 
clue. In the middle of (reading) an essay on realism, Coetzee puts the following words in the mouth of 
Elizabeth Costello: “[U]nless certain scenes are skipped over, we will be here all afternoon” (Coetzee, 
Elizabeth Costello 16). From Dusklands onward, he uses disruptive tricks of this sort—tricks that both 
highlight the unreliability of unselfconsciously following prescribed literary conventions and 
(modernistically) undermine those conventions by explicitly calling attention to their presence. In 
Dusklands, and alongside the darkly humorous effect produced by Jacobus Coetzee’s racist and 
patronizing comments on his “faithful servant” Klawer, we encounter the following: “A convention 
allows me to record these details. I have missed certain words” (42). (These details, meta-narratively 
alluded to via a present-tense, first-person utterance by the supposed narrator and agent of the act in 
question, Eugene Dawn, concern his crazed stabbing of his own son.) Both in the novels, through 
ironical metafictional gestures of the sort just quoted, and in the essays on literary criticism, Coetzee 
acknowledges that our attempts to transcend realism may have in fact been unsuccessful. In a telling 
passage from “The First Sentence of Yvonne Burgess’ The Strike,” he writes: 
Having accepted that transcendence of the illusionism of Realism is an illusory hope, that to get 
behind (aufheben) fiction by incorporating into fiction a critical consciousness of the procedures 
of fiction is only to climb another spiral of illusionistic Realism, one may be taking refuge, like 
John Barth9, in Nietzschean gaiety. (Doubling 92) 
But what can gaiety or any of the forms of ironical exercise we’ve analyzed thus far—forms of 
irony that reflect on the constraints of convention and at the same time enact the omnipotence of the 
writer who claims to be so constrained—do for our persistent attempt to understand where to position 
Coetzee’s work in terms of the polarizing aesthetic/historical categories on which we so often rely? Or 
for the ethical thrust of his literary project as whole? A conversation with David Attwell might provide 
a clue here. In the interview on Kafka, Attwell confronts Coetzee with this question: “My question, then, 
is an attempt to trace the outer limit of your interest in Kafka: to what extent are you able to see 
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yourself—and perhaps aspects of contemporary white South African writing more generally, as an 
ethical and marginal enterprise—as inhabiting a form of late modernism?” (Doubling 198). After 
detailing the grounds of his artistic indebtedness to Kafka, Coetzee gets to the bulk of the question on 
late modernism:  
The direction of your question is undoubtedly interesting: does serious contemporary writing by 
whites in South Africa not inhabit a position we can call late-modernism? (Do I detect the 
qualifier merely late-modernist hanging in the air?) But before I respond I want to position 
myself. For I do not wish to respond from the marked or negative position, to embrace ethicalism 
or anything else from a position in the dialogue that is already marked as the position of the 
negative, the position of the mere. So, for instance, the last thing I want to do is to defiantly 
embrace the ethical as against the political. I don’t want to contribute, in that way, toward 
marking the ethical as the pole with the lack. I neither claim nor fail to claim that my reservations 
open up for me a third position. I neither claim nor fail to claim that there can be a third position. 
I do say that if I speak from a pole-position, from the negative pole, it is because I am drawn or 
pushed there by a force, even a violence, operating over the whole of the discursive field that at 
this moment (April 1990) we inhabit, you and I. (200) 
Here, of course, the effect produced is not straightforwardly ironic. Coetzee’s refusal to position his 
own work within the boundaries of a “school” or a familiarly labeled artistic movement (with the added 
twist that he is being pushed in that direction by a violence that operates on discourse) might be said to 
provoke a similar disruptive effect on the critic, however—a disruption noticed by the reader (in fact, 
Attwell feels the need to assure him, further along in the conversation, that he did not mean to invoke 
the idea of “mere late-modernism”). What both irony and refusal (as undermining strategies) do in fact 
have in common is the ability to disabuse us of a certain taxonomic fetishism that aims at either clear-
cut or gentler (or mixed) polarizations. In a way, we are back to Attridge’s insight on the singularity of 
the encounter with the literary work as an event that is ethical to the core—ethical in the sense that, 
“being an event of human signification,” the literary text does indeed make specific demands on us to 
respect its individuality and avoid (simple or complex) reductions to, for instance, aesthetic 
categorization. But we are also within the field of a Wittgensteinian understanding of ethics and 
language: you have to throw away the ladder once you’ve climbed it (once you’ve understood; in this 
specific case, once you’ve understood how the realism-modernism-postmodernism dynamic might 
plausibly be accounted for). We are also within the more familiar dialectic of responsibility that 
underlines both the multilayered composition of Diary and a faithful, multilayered interpretation of the 
liberal intellectual’s (read: our own) position.  
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Textual evidence for Coetzee’s theoretical endorsement and literary use of irony is, as we’ve 
seen thus far, abundant. In particular, however, two further significant instances of ironic speech and 
self-conscious appraisal of irony as a method (linked with the dialogical project framed in this 
discussion) deserve mention. In a two-page reply to Cavalieri’s highly structured philosophical dialogue 
on perfectionism, Coetzee picks up on the dialogue by asking: “Question: To whom is the lifestyle, and 
perhaps even the life, of A[lexandra] and T[heo] available? Is it available to a horse?—Answer (Pace 
Jonathan Swift): No, not as far as we know. . . . Question: Is it compatible with a life, off the page, 
devoted to brawling and guzzling and fucking? Answer: Perhaps, but only with a measure of psychic 
dislocation” (Cavalieri 85). Further, when invited to comment on Jonathan Lear’s treatment of the topic 
in A Case for Irony, the main tenet of which concerns the strangeness of and estrangement from the 
familiar that (Socratic and Kierkegaardian) irony subtly provokes (i.e. the condition of finding oneself 
unable to understand, in any familiar way, the practical identity one assumed one had mastered or 
inhabited), Coetzee writes the following: “Before we can claim to live a truly examined life, says 
Jonathan Lear, we need to pass the test of ironic self-scrutiny at something approaching the level set by 
Socrates and Kierkegaard. Following the contours of the subtle case for radical irony made by Lear turns 
out to be an intellectual adventure in its own right.” In the present analysis, Coetzee himself employs a 
kindred ironical self-scrutiny to address the question of the affiliation between his work and traditional 
aesthetic/historical categories (reflected on both in the novels and in interview comments). This self-
scrutiny undermines any attempt to identify Coetzee’s work with realism, modernism or postmodernism 
directly—a body of work that nonetheless pays extremely close attention to the historical and ethical 
significance of these legacies.  
As we know all too well, classification brings with it the risk of illicitly erasing everything and 
everyone inhabiting the margins. These margins may be geographic (with the further dangers of catch-
all regionalizations, which, as Coetzee himself acknowledges, have prevailed in South African literature 
and in views on South African literature), but they may also be emergent islands of meaning, deeply 
idiosyncratic exercises in resisting resistance to paradox—not least, the paradox of classification. The 





1 This lecture was delivered by Coetzee under the title “What is Realism” as part of the Ben Belitt lectureship 
series at Bennington College in November 1996. 
2 The claim Attridge alludes to is part of a talk given by Coetzee at the University of Cape Town in 1986. Coetzee 
said: “In times of intense ideological pressure like the present, when the space in which the novel and history 
normally coexist like two cows on the same pasture, each minding his own business, is squeezed to almost nothing, 
the novel, it seems to me, has only two options, supplementarity or rivalry.” He then goes on to advocate rivalry.  
3 For the phrase “ersatz ethical thought” I am indebted to Jonathan Lear (“Ethical Thought” 74).  
4 The destabilization of authority at work in Diary (and throughout Coetzee’s fiction) finds an interesting parallel 
in his essay “Confession and Double Thoughts” (1985). Here, he considers examples of secular confession in the 
work of Tolstoy, Rousseau, and Dostoevsky; in particular, he considers how these authors “confront or evade the 
problem of how to know the truth about the self without being self-deceived, and of how to bring the confession 
to an end in the spirit of […] absolution” (194). The confessing consciousness is revealed as being involved in an 
infinite regress—unable to locate a self-contained ground for the desire to “tell the truth about the self” that does 
not itself give rise to further doubts about sincerity, and thus to further grounds for confession. Coetzee closes the 
essay by articulating the strategy employed by Tolstoy in the latter’s puzzling Afterword to The Kreutzer Sonata, 
itself a response to letters from his readers asking for clarification, and thus for authority, in which he provides a 
list of mundane ethical prescriptions (lessons to be learned from the text). For one who recognizes that the regress 
of self-doubt “has proved itself merely an endless treadmill,” Coetzee writes, “what potential for the attainment of 
truth can there be in the self-interrogation of a confessing consciousness?” Tolstoy’s strategy, as Coetzee presents 
it, constitutes an understandable response to the reality of this endless treadmill: “[W]e see (I speculate now) 
disillusionment, boredom with this particular mill for cranking truth out of lies, impatience with the novelistic 
motions that must be gone through before truth may emerge (a truth that anyhow always emerges as provisional, 
tainted with doubt from the processes it has gone through), and a (rash?) decision to set down the truth, finally, as 
though after a lifetime of exploring one had acquired the credentials, amassed the authority, to do so” (232). 
Tolstoy’s endorsement of and identification with a particular vantage is a response to a text that very subtly and 
cleverly stirs up doubt in the reader regarding authoritative truth about the self, as disclosed by Pozdnyshev’s 
confession to a mute narrator. In his essay, Coetzee appreciates how Tolstoy’s lack of authorial commentary on 
Pozdnyshev’s dogmatic assumptions about himself left his readers with uncomfortable doubts about what he 
(Tolstoy) truly meant. “Confession and Double Thoughts” is thus instructive for readers of Diary, which is likewise 
a text in which our hankering for truth and identification is continually frustrated. Where Tolstoy, in his Afterword, 
apparently gives in to disillusionment with the supposed utilitarian benefits of late-nineteenth-century amoralism, 
Coetzee refuses to “set down the truth,” leaving it to his reader to engage fully with the uncomfortable regress of 
authority and identity. Such engagement, as I argue here, is precisely what the dialectic of responsibility depends 
on.  
5 The passage in italics is from Machiavelli’s The Prince, Chap. XVIII. 
6 As a reviewer pointed out to me, this claim for accountability on Coetzee’s part is again problematic. In a strict 
legal sense, Coetzee’s publishers are partly responsible (so, accountable) for the existence of Diary as a cultural 
item on the market. But so is Coetzee, since in asserting his moral rights he is bound to be morally responsible (so, 
accountable) for the text. The trouble is, on an understanding of morality that reaches beyond the limits of legality 
Coetzee is toying with these categories, and his effort to disrupt these formal rules is backed up by a long tradition 
of modernist writing where the issue of accountability is raised and dealt with precisely via formal experimentation. 
What is more, formal experimentation in the modernist tradition has explicitly (and often ironically) addressed 
issues of personal (here I feel like saying “civilian”) authorship for its own sake; already in the Victorian golden 
age of the novel, however, the issue was inadvertently posed by the fact that female writers like Jane Austen and 
George Elliot were only able to publish their work under (male) pseudonyms. 
7 Eagleton’s inspiration is clearly Ian Watt’s classic study from 1957, The Rise of the Novel. There, Watt forcefully 
argues that the most important influences exercised on the novel by main trends of thought in modern philosophy, 
from Defoe onwards, are methodological in nature. That is to say: the modern novel, whilst not itself philosophical, 
mirrors and embodies in its narrative form the methodological commitments common to both empiricism and 
rationalism. Watt elaborates on several strands of that method: one of them is the experience-based construction 
of character. The deep character of the realist novel is, for Watt, the character that displays accrued and assimilated 
experience in its individuation. Curiously enough, Coetzee himself said that, when conducting research to support 
Foe’s form and storyline, he was particularly inspired by Watt’s claim about the decline of irony in popular 
democracies and public discourse, adding that it impacted on the general tone of Foe (Doubling 146). In line with 
what will be defended in the last point of this paper, we might well speculate that it is indeed an urge to rehabilitate 
irony at the level of narrative and character- and plot-construction that at the same time explains (in part) Foe’s 
indebtedness to Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and safeguards its distinctively modernistic ironic elements. Chiefly 
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concerned with explaining the birth of the genre in English, through a detailed analysis of the projects of Defoe, 
Richardson and Fielding, Watt does not have a story to tell about modernism’s evolution out of realism. 
8 See esp. Mulhall, The Wounded Animal chs. 9 and 10, and Mulhall, “The Melodramatic Reality of Film and 
Philosophy” and “Countering the Ballad of Co-Dependency” in The Self and Its Shadows.  
9 Although I cannot here pursue a thorough comparison between Coetzee’s ultimate refusal to submit his literary 
project to aesthetic categorization and John Barth’s own view on what, having inherited the traditions of realism 
and modernism, postmodernist fiction and a postmodernist writer can aspire to be, a brief mention of what sets 
them apart is in order. In “The Literature of Replenishment,” Barth, also using a recognizable Hegelian metaphor, 
suggests a model for the postmodernist author to follow. He writes: “A worthy program for post-modernist fiction, 
I believe, is the synthesis or transcension of these antitheses, which may be summed up as pre-modernist and 
modernist modes of writing. My ideal postmodernist author neither merely repudiates nor merely imitates either 
his twentieth-century modernist parents or his nineteenth-century premodernist grandparents. He has the first half 
of our century under his belt, but not on his back. . . . He may not hope to reach and move the devotees of James 
Michener and Irving Wallace—not to mention the great mass of television addicted non-readers. But he should 
hope to reach and delight, at least part of the time, beyond the circle of what Mann used to call the Early Christians: 
professional devotees of high art” (203). Barth counts himself as fitting this model. Coetzee, by contrast, when 
pushed to categorically circumscribe his own novelistic project, and although speaking of a similar Hegelian 
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